Many business relationships rely on loose arrangements and relational dynamics in early interactions, only to solidify their alliances through contractual commitments later. Using a repeated-games framework with a finite horizon, we show how such a hybrid-contracting strategy can both extend the duration of a cooperative business relationship (intensive margin) and expand the set of environments in which cooperation can be achieved (extensive margin). We model the contractual- commitment part of hybrid contracting as a smooth-landing contract that restricts the action space only in the backend of the relationship. Such a flexible contract outperforms more rigid contractual arrangements because it does not crowd out early-stage cooperation, thereby complementing relational dynamics. Our results are robust to extensions that account for variations in contract costs and timing, and we show that optimal contract length trades off profitability with implementability.

We study how public pricing in litigation finance markets affects plaintiffs’ financing decisions and settlement bargaining. A plaintiff sells shares of case proceeds via a market maker whose price reveals case quality. Settlement is modeled as a one-sided private information game where the defendant makes offers. We show that plaintiffs optimally oversell their claims relative to efficient risk sharing: reduced risk exposure enables credible commitment to tougher settlement demands, and bargaining gains exceed the per-share price discount. More informative prices amplify this overselling, as better signals disproportionately benefit investors. The welfare implications of public prices are therefore ambiguous—better information fosters agreement but strengthens commitment motives. Endogenous investor mass further reinforces overselling by spreading exposure across multiple investors.

Social media fosters parasocial relationships–nonreciprocal emotional bonds between users and media figures–causing paid endorsements to blur the boundary between advertisement and genuine personal recommendation. Starting from a model in which consumers rely on impartial recommendations to make purchase decisions under quality uncertainty, I introduce social media endorsements as a source of additional biased recommendations that may get perceived as genuine. I find that a low-quality firm, whose recommendations are relatively more distorted, is more likely to engage in social media advertising than a high-quality firm. With a monopolist firm, prices remain unchanged whereas under duopolistic competition expected prices decrease due to an increase in competition. Further, I show that while a monopolist engaging in social media advertising cannot lead to an increase in consumer surplus, improvements to consumer surplus and welfare are possible in a competitive market if the price effect outweighs a potential decrease in average product quality.

I research a model of secondary markets to filter potential buyers of a rationed/highly scarce product. The secondary market selects consumers based on their internal valuation (which does not perfectly correlate with willingness to pay) which either directly or indirectly increases the utility of the seller.